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Maynard V. Olson <mvo@u.washington.edu> 
To: Kathryn Maxson <kat.maxson@duke.edu> 
Cc: Bob Cook-Deegan <bob.cd@duke.edu> 




Certainly, you may post this e-mail exchange in a public archive without restrictions on 
access.  Great news about Princeton.  Even I am aware that this is a top program in the 




On Thu, 16 May 2013, Kathryn Maxson wrote: 
 
Dear Maynard, 
I hope you are well!  
We are well along in organizing our Bermuda files for deposition into a public archive. 
This email (fwd below), in which you embedded some thoughts in February 2012, would 
be very useful to scholars of the HGP, I think. 
Do I have your permission to post it, under the heading "2012 some thoughts on HGP 






PS: I'll be starting at the PhD Program in History of Science at Princeton this fall. 
Thought you might be interested in knowing, since you were there for some of the frenzy 
leading up to my applications. 
 
Begin forwarded message: 
 
From: Robert Cook-Deegan <bob.cd@duke.edu> 
Subject: Fwd: Congressional record of July 1998 hrg 
Date: February 8, 2012 6:10:32 PM EST 
To: Kathryn Maxson <kat.maxson@duke.edu> 
Reply-To: bob.cd@duke.edu 
 
Meant to cc you in the loop. 
BCD 
 
---------- Forwarded message ---------- 
 
From: Maynard Olson <mvo@u.washington.edu> 
This PDF packet contains an e-mail chain, edited as a Word document and then re-
converted o PDF, for ease of reading and understanding (pp. 1-4). The original email 
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Date: Wed, Feb 8, 2012 at 11:23 AM 
Subject: Re: Congressional record of July 1998 hrg 
To: Robert Cook-Deegan <bob.cd@duke.edu> 
 
Bob, 
See my embedded comments. 
Maynard 
 
On Tue, 7 Feb 2012, Robert Cook-Deegan wrote: 
Here it is. 
 
To follow up on Thursday night's conversation, and to clarify my thinking, one or two 
further thoughts occurred to me. 
 
Given that most gaps that are hard to close are in repeat sequences, and those sequences 
in telomeres and centromeres may not be doing the informational work, but may be more 
related to 3-D structure, attachment to cellular organelles, and other non-coding 
functions, how "catastrophic" are they? Doe they get in the way of most uses of 
sequence?  
Most uses?  Probably not.  It is in the nature of cream skimming that it captures a lot of 
the good stuff at low cost.  However, in the human, it is a misperception that we are just 
talking about specialized genomic compartments.  Neither Craig nor I were talking about 
the problems associated with highly repetitive sequences such as those at telomeres and 
centromeres.  Neither the public project nor anyone else was targeting these sequences in 
a serious way, then or now.  My hundred thousand gaps were distributed fairly uniformly 
across the genome.  While it is true that they are more likely to be in non-coding than 
coding regions, keep in mind that >98% of the genome is non-coding.  When the average 
gene is in multiple pieces, genome sequences lose utility for many purposes.  Just one 
example would be every step of the GWAS process (fleshing out dbSNP, building the 
HAP map, interpreting population-specific effects on linkage-disequilibrium, choosing a 
covering set of sentinel SNPs, interpreting whatever associations are found).  Sequencing 
the whole gene-containing portion of the Y chromosome, an exercise that yielded rich 
evolutionary and medical insights, pushed even the clone-by-clone methods to their 
limits--WGS just left a pile of debris. 
 
Can you think of an example of a scientific project that got halfway and stopped because 
the "oomph went out" of the project as a subordinate but sexier goal was 
accomplished?  I know this was a commonly voiced concern; I just don't know how real 
the danger is. 
I will not try to generalize over the vast variety of scientific projects. In genomics, the risk 
was and is certainly real.  Indeed, in the headlong rush into Illumina sequencing, there 
are many areas in which the "oomph" has drained out of efforts to understand biology 
whose genomic underpinnings are hard to get at with the new methods.  A good example 
would be HLA associations, the mother of all genetic associations. Thirty years after 
Dausset's discovery, we still do not know whether the strong associations between type I 
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diabetes and HLA haplotypes involve events that occur in the thymus or the 
pancreas.  Most of the reason for this lacuna is that the genomics needed to solve the 
problem requires a kind of persistence that the system rarely musters.  Happily, one time 
this level of persistence was achieved was in the HGP. 
 
Finally, seems to me that the arguments that were strong at the time were basically:  
A) We have a goal and we have a process that will reach it. Don't pull back now.  
B) There's a new strategy.  It is basically orthogonal to ours.  It can build on ours but not 
vice versa.  It may or may not work, and there is good reason to think there will be holes 
in the map at the end. The "not vice versa" point is the critical one. 
 
The policy decision for a Member of Congress is not all that hard.  You keep on with 
publicly funded effort; you figure the private effort will use private $ so is not so much 
your concern.  That seems to be more or less what happened; indeed, Wellcome placed a 
bigger bet and NIH and DOE kept on going, with no appreciable budget cuts or admin 
interference that I'm aware of. Celera also proceeded. 
You could judge better than I whether there was real political risk. There still was some 
residue of Gingrich I in the Beltway at the time--sell the National Parks, privatize 
education, rely on Big Pharma to improve health, bet on the ingenuity of the dot com's. 
 
Some questions in my mind: 
1.  This is obviously wasteful to have two efforts when there could be one. But that's 
completely rational if there was an active technical dispute and both options get 
pursued. Quite common in biological and social systems; value of redundancy and 
overlapping strategies.  Somewhat inefficient, but many advantages: urgency and 
competition between the two approaches, if one fails the other might work; if the benefits 
are big, the short-term costs are dwarfed by them.  
Absolutely true, as anyone in the private sector will confirm.  We do not have great disk 
drives because we put all our disk drive engineers under one roof responding to one set 
of incentives.  In the Soviet Union, there was a remarkable ability to pursue top-down 
projects judged to be in the national interest.  The problem was that only a modest 
number of activities lend themselves to this approach.  Even the Manhattan Project 
involved a lot of bet hedging, particularly on approaches to uranium enrichment and 
commitment to the radically different engineering challenges posed by uranium and 
plutonium bombs. 
 
2.  Was there harm from doing a "draft" sequence, aside from the added expense? 
No, the "draft" was a good idea.  There was not much added cost and quite a lot of 
utility.  I think the only concerns about the "draft" related to the risks, discussed above, 
that it would lead to a loss of momentum. Francis's commitment to a quality sequence 
was always suspect. 
 
3.  Were there opportunity costs from doing a draft sequence? 
No, nothing significant. 
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4.  How does an objective observer decide in the end whether the optimal strategy would 
have been public project only, public project + Celera, or no public project + Celera.  In a 
way, the decision re Celera is not a policy decision, since it's basically PE-Applera-
whateveritsnamewasthatweek's investment decision.  The policy decisions are: continue 
public project, continue public project with draft sequence, discontinue public 
project. Option 3 seems highly risky and unwise given arguments A and B above.  So 
how to discern wisdom of diverting resources to draft sequence? 
A pure Celera world would have been a disaster.  Eventually, the scientific community 
would have recovered its balance, but it is difficult to over-state the scientific and policy 
ramifications that would have ensued.  I do think it is obvious that the Celera challenge 
accelerated the public effort significantly (and said so in my JMB article). John Sulston 
disagrees, but he did not have to deal with the US funding system. 
 
There is another set of questions that should have a technical answer about the technical 
dispute. What are the advantages and disadvantages of the Celera v public domain 
sequence?  Public project has huge advantage of being open and available. Heidi 
Williams's paper shows that matters for advancement of science, at least, and it's 
probably more or less the same story for technology and application, although would be 
harder to prove.  A 30% advantage in access to and utilization of a data resource is a 
pretty big deal. 
It is impossible to imagine doing science in a world where private players have long-term 
control of data that play central roles in major fields. We really are talking about the 
"evil empire" here.  Science may often disappoint, but virtually all other areas of our 
collective lives disappoint more often and more alarmingly. 
 
Just some thoughts.  Obviously fuzzy and unfocused. 
 




Robert Cook-Deegan, MD 
Genome Ethics, Law & Policy 
Institute for Genome Sciences & Policy and 
Sanford School of Public Policy 
Duke University, Box 90141 
304 Research Drive 






Certainly, you may post this e-mail excahange in a public archive without restrictions on access.  Great news
about Princeton.  Even I am aware that this is a top program in the history of science.  Keep in touch.
Maynard
On Thu, 16 May 2013, Kathryn Maxson wrote:
Dear Maynard,I hope you are well! 
We are well along in organizing our Bermuda files for deposition into a public archive. This
email (fwd below), in which you embedded some thoughts in February 2012, would be very useful to
scholars of the HGP, I think.





PS: I'll be starting at the PhD Program in History of Science at Princeton this fall. Thought
you might be interested in knowing, since you were there for some of the frenzy leading up to my
applications.
Begin forwarded message:
     From: Robert Cook-Deegan <bob.cd@duke.edu>
Subject: Fwd: Congressional record of July 1998 hrg
Date: February 8, 2012 6:10:32 PM EST
To: Kathryn Maxson <kat.maxson@duke.edu>
Reply-To: bob.cd@duke.edu
Meant to cc you in the loop.
BCD
---------- Forwarded message ----------
From: Maynard Olson <mvo@u.washington.edu>
Date: Wed, Feb 8, 2012 at 11:23 AM
Subject: Re: Congressional record of July 1998 hrg
To: Robert Cook-Deegan <bob.cd@duke.edu>
Bob,
See my embedded comments.
Maynard
On Tue, 7 Feb 2012, Robert Cook-Deegan wrote:
     Here it is.
     To follow up on Thursday night's conversation, and to clarify my thinking,
     one or two further thoughts occurred to me.
     Given that most gaps that are hard to close are in repeat sequences, and
Maynard Olson <mvo@u.washington.edu>
To: Kathryn Maxson <kat.maxson@duke.edu>
Cc: Bob Cook-Deegan <bob.cd@duke.edu>
Re: Fwd: Congressional record of July 1998 hrg
 
May 26, 2013  7:28 PM
     those sequences in telomeres and centromeres may not be doing the
     informational work, but may be more related to 3-D structure, attachment to
     cellular organelles, and other non-coding functions, how "catastrophic" are
     they? Doe they get in the way of most uses of sequence? 
Most uses?  Probably not.  It is in the nature of cream-skimming that it captures a lot of
the good stuff at low cost.  However, in the human, it is a mis-perception that we are
just talking about specialized genomic compartments.  Neither Craig nor I were talking
about the problems associated with highly repetitive sequences such as those at telomeres
and centromeres.  Neither the public project nor anyone else was targeting these sequences
in a serious way, then or now.  My hundred thousand gaps were distributed fairly uniformly
across the genome.  While it is true that they are more likely to be in non-coding than
coding regions, keep in mind that >98% of the genome is non-coding.  When the average gene
is in multiple pieces, genome sequences lose utility for many purposes.  Just one example
would be every step of the GWAS process (fleshing out dbSNP, building the HAP map,
interpreting population-specific effects on linkage-disequilibrium, choosing a covering
set of sentinel SNPs, interpreting whatever associations are found).  Sequencing the whole
gene-containing portion of the Y chromosome, an exercise that yielded rich evolutionary
and medical insights, pushed even the clone-by-clone methods to their limits--WGS just
left a pile of debris.
     Can you think of an example of a scientific project that got halfway and
     stopped because the "oomph went out" of the project as a subordinate but
     sexier goal was accomplished?  I know this was a commonly voiced concern; I
     just don't know how real the danger is.
I will not try to generalize over the vast variety of scientific projects. In genomics,
the risk was and is certainly real.  Indeed, in the headlong rush into Illumina
sequencing, there are many areas in which the "oomph" has drained out of efforts to
understand biology whose genomic underpinnings are hard to get at with the new methods.  A
good example would be HLA associations, the mother of all genetic associations. Thirty
years after Dausset's discovry, we still do not know whether the strong associations
between type I diabetes and HLA haplotypes involve events that occur in the thymus or the
pancreas.  Most of the reason for this lacuna is that the genomics needed to solve the
problem requires a kind of persistence that the system rarely musters.  Happily, one time
this level of persistence was achieved was in the HGP.
     Finally, seems to me that the arguments that were strong at the time were
     basically: A) we have a goal and we have a process that will reach it. 
     Don't pull back now.
     B)  There's a new strategy.  It is basically orthogonal to ours.  It can
     build on ours but not vice versa.  It may or may not work, and there is good
     reason to think there will be holes in the map at the end.
The "not vice versa" point is the critical one.
     The policy decision for a Member of Congress is not all that hard.  You keep
     on with publicly funded effort; you figure the private effort will use
     private $ so is not so much your concern.  That seems to be more or less
     what happened; indeed, Wellcome placed a bigger bet and NIH and DOE kept on
     going, with no appreciable budget cuts or admin interference that I'm aware
     of.  Celera also proceeded.
You could judge better than I whether there was real political risk. There still was some
residue of Gingrich I in the Beltway at the time--sell the National Parks, privatize
education, rely on Big Pharma to improve health, bet on the ingenuity of the .com's.
     Some questions in my mind:
     1.  This is obviously wasteful to have two efforts when there could be one. 
     But that's completely rational if there was an active technical dispute and
     both options get pursued.  Quite common in biological and social systems;
     value of redundancy and overlapping strategies.  Somewhat inefficient, but
     many advantages: urgency and competition between the two approaches, if one
     fails the other might work; if the benefits are big, the short-term costs
     are dwarfed by them. 
Absolutely true, as anyone in the private sector will confirm.  We do not have great disk
drives because we put all our disk-drive engineers under one roof responding to one set of
incentives.  In the Soviet Union, there was a remarkable ability to pursue top-down
projects judged to be in the national interest.  The problem was that only a modest number
of activities lend themselves to this approach.  Even the Manhattan Project involved a lot
of bet-hedging, particularly on approaches to uranium enrichment and commitment to the
radically different engineering challenges posed by uranium and pultonium bombs.
     2.  Was there harm from doing a "draft" sequence, aside from the added
     expense?
No, the "draft" was a good idea.  There was not much added cost and quite a lot of
utility.  I think the only concerns about the "draft" related to the risks, discussed
above, that it would lead to a loss of momentum. Francis's commitment to a quality
sequence was always suspect.
     3.  Were there opportunity costs from doing a draft sequence?
No, nothing significant.
     4.  How does an objective observer decide in the end whether the optimal
     strategy would have been public project only, public project + Celera, or no
     public project + Celera.  In a way, the decision re Celera is not a policy
     decision, since it's basically PE-Applera-whateveritsnamewasthatweek's
     investment decision.  The policy decisions are: continue public project,
     continue public project with draft sequence, discontinue public project. 
     Option 3 seems highly risky and unwise given arguments A and B above.  So
     how to discern wisdom of diverting resources to draft sequence?
A pure Celera world would have been a disaster.  Eventually, the scientific community
would have recovered its balance, but it is difficult to over-state the scientific and
policy ramifications that would have ensued.  I do think it is obvious that the Celera
challenge accelerated the public effort significantly (and said so in my JMB article).
 John Sulston disagrees, but he did not have to deal with the US funding system.
     There is another set of questions that should have a technical answer about
     the technical dispute.
     What are the advantages and disadvantages of the Celera v public domain
     sequence?  Public project has huge advantage of being open and available. 
     Heidi Williams's paper shows that matters for advancement of science, at
     least, and it's probably more or less the same story for technology and
     application, although would be harder to prove.  A 30% advantage in access
     to and utilization of a data resource is a pretty big deal.
It is impossible to imagine doing science in a world where private players have long-term
control of data that play central roles in major fields. We really are talking about the
"evil empire" here.  Science may often disappoint, but virutally all other areas of our
collective lives disappoint more often and more alarmingly.
     Just some thoughts.  Obviously fuzzy and unfocused.
The same applies to my responses.
     BCD
     BCD
     =======================
     Robert Cook-Deegan, MD
     Genome Ethics, Law & Policy
     Institute for Genome Sciences & Policy and
     Sanford School of Public Policy
     Duke University, Box 90141
     304 Research Drive
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     919.668.0790
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